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In 2013, the Danish government crafted a policy to guide its integrated 
stabilization efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states, emphasizing the prevention of 
violent conflict. This capstone project provides recommendations and guidelines for 
Danish politicians and the Danish defense command to operationalize this policy and 
define the supportive role that Danish special operations forces (DANSOF) can play. The 
capstone draws from a rich body of stabilization literature to provide working definitions 
for a whole-of-government approach; goals, measures of success, and risk assessment; 
capacity- and state-building strategies; and the incorporation of intelligence and 
information operations. This research also considers DANSOF capabilities and recent 
involvement in Afghanistan to identify the various roles DANSOF can play in 
stabilization operations. To increase the chances of successful stabilization efforts, it is 
essential that international efforts be well coordinated, including goals, ways, and means. 
This capstone recommends that DANSOF can support these efforts in roles such as 
prevention, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and assessment, security, capacity 
building, support to national and international agencies, and liaison with international 
agencies and local authorities. 
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Since the end of the Cold War, conflicts have erupted in fragile states around the 
world, posing frequent challenges to regional and global security. This proliferation of 
conflicts and the various interventions attempted have exposed a need for more holistic 
approaches that better integrate the tools of intervention. For this reason, a whole-of-
government approach, as opposed to strictly military action, is now a crucial part of 
international stabilization efforts. 
Several countries have developed strategies and doctrines for preventing or 
addressing conflicts in fragile states. In the United Kingdom, for example, stability 
strategies focus primarily on preemption through early warning, rapid crisis prevention 
and response, and “upstream” prevention—that is, defusing conflicts before they become 
violent.1 Collectively, these activities help predict emerging conflicts, ensure fast and 
effective responses, and assist fragile countries in building strong and legitimate 
institutions.  
The U.S. security strategy of 2015 also emphasizes a need for bolstering fragile 
states and preventing violence from erupting: “we will focus on building the capacity of 
others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict”2 and “[we] have a strong 
interest in leading an international response to genocide and mass atrocities when they 
arise, recognizing options are more extensive and less costly when we act preventively 
before situations reach crisis proportions.”3 
Denmark has developed policies for assisting fragile states as well, emphasizing 
violence prevention in its 2013 adopted policy on stabilization efforts in conflict-affected 
                                                 
1 “Building Stability Overseas Strategy,” Department for International Development (DfID), The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), July 2011, 18, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67475/Building-stability-
overseas-strategy.pdf. 
2 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, February 2015, 
7, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. 
3 “The National Security Strategy,” The White House, February 2015, 22. 
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and fragile states.4 Drawing on lessons from Danish engagements in Somalia, Mali, 
Syria, and Afghanistan, the policy, known as “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilization 
Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World” (DISE), prescribes a 
whole-of-government approach to stabilization and seeks to integrate political, 
developmental, and security-related activities in a comprehensive program, whether 
before, during, or after a conflict. The policy emphasizes that integrated stabilization 
efforts may include military elements and asserts that Denmark must continue supporting 
the joint stabilization efforts of its international partners, which include the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN). 
Denmark’s responsibilities as an ally and its commitment to international peace 
and stability present Danish policymakers with important considerations in the use of the 
armed forces. As a small nation with limited military capacity, declining military 
budgets, and a general dissociation from too many casualties, Denmark must ask why it 
should deploy a large military force and commit extensive resources to the peace and 
stability of a fragile state if a smaller contingent and lesser efforts can perform the 
mission. The role of Danish special operations forces (DANSOF) in enacting DISE 
policy is a critical question.  
This capstone identifies Danish governmental, military, and particularly 
DANSOF capabilities and actions that may prevent conflicts from emerging or mitigate 
crises once they occur. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research asks, how may DANSOF best be used to support a policy of 
integrated stabilization engagement in fragile and conflict-ridden areas of the world? 
                                                 
4 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the 
World,” Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) [Udenrigsministeriet], Ministry of Defense (MoD), 





This capstone employs two broad methods to examine the potential of DANSOF 
in DISE operations. First, it surveys the rich body of theoretical literature on such topics 
as the stabilization of fragile states; whole-of-government intervention; goals, measures 
of success, and risk assessment in fragile states; capacity and state-building strategies; 
and the importance of intelligence and information operations. The capstone then 
provides a summary of considerations and best practices for violence prevention and 
countermeasures. 
Second, this research considers DANSOF capabilities and recent DANSOF 
involvement in Afghanistan to identify the Danish approach to security-force 
development and stabilization. The capstone further analyzes experiences of other nations 
with SOF units in Afghanistan and Iraq to support or qualify DANSOF lessons learned. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
This capstone proposes that a number of DANSOF’s core capabilities are ideal for 
use in stabilization engagements, most notably the following:  
 Early reconnaissance and intelligence gathering in the operational 
environment 
 Assistance in planning, deployment, and execution of other agencies’ 
tasks 
 Training and advising indigenous-partner security forces and developing 
their intelligence capacity 
 Collaborating with international agencies and local authorities  
These DANSOF capabilities support DISE in the key areas of rapid reaction, 




Chapter II of this capstone presents a summary of DISE policy, principal efforts, 
and stabilization tools. Literature, doctrines, and policy are investigated to define and 
explain 
 Stabilization engagements 
 The whole-of-government approach 
 Goals, measurements of success, and risk acceptance 
 Capacity- and state-building.  
The chapter discusses two vital tools that should be included in Danish efforts 
overall—namely, intelligence and information activities. 
Chapter III describes SOF doctrine and characteristics, the Danish special 
operations command and DANSOF. A narrative of DANSOF stabilization engagements 
in the province of Helmand in 2012 is provided, in which DANSOF trained an Afghan 
police provincial response company as part of a NATO-led international security-
assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. An analysis of the Danish deployment and 
gleanings from allied experiences conclude the chapter.  
Chapter IV makes recommendations concerning Danish integrated-stabilization 




II. DISE POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Danish ministries of foreign affairs, defense, development 
cooperation, and justice drafted a document titled, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation 
Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World” (DISE), enunciating a 
policy to “establish a common framework and concept clarification for the various 
partners involved in stabilisation efforts.”5 This policy, adopted in September 2013, 
focuses on fragile states incapable of providing basic governmental functions such as 
security, development, and human rights. These deficiencies may lead to crises such as 
genocide, massive refugee flight, humanitarian disasters, piracy, and terrorist safe havens. 
The overall goal of Danish stabilization efforts is to strengthen government capacity and 
institutions and improve accountability so as to prevent potential crises from ever 
unfolding. 
B. SUMMARY OF DISE CONTENT 
DISE policy identifies resources for preventing state failure, ranging from 
humanitarian relief to military intervention, and outlines five principal approaches and six 
tools toward this end, as summarized in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
5 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 9. 
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The approaches of DISE policy are summarized as follows:  
a. Develop Social Institutions, Economic Capacity, and Democracy 
The main focus of DISE is to help countries build vital social institutions and 
create economic growth, employment, democratic inclusion, and democratic control.  
b. Promote Justice and Security-Sector Reform 
DISE encourages justice and security-sector reform and recognizes the need to 
assist judicial institutions, the police, the prison system, border control, etc. The creation 
of durable local entities through advisement, education, and mentoring is emphasized.  
                                                 
6 Adapted from “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ. 
Approaches  
1. Develop social institutions, economic capacity, and democracy 
2. Promote justice and security-sector reform 
3. Use diplomacy  
4. Support Civil and NGO efforts 






5. Civilian experts 
6. Danish Emergency Management Agency 
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c. Use Diplomacy 
DISE stresses the importance of diplomacy in creating a unified international 
direction, responsibility, and consensus. Local trust and understanding of stabilization 
efforts must also be built.  
d. Support Civil and Non-Governmental Efforts  
DISE encourages improvements in civil society by supporting collective capacity-
building efforts that foster durable governmental institutions. DISE recognizes that a 
decisive effort to provide interim basic services through civilian or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) means may be needed until a weak state is strong enough to take 
over. International civil-society organizations, partner nations, and NGOs are invaluable 
as partners.  
e. Emphasize Human Rights  
 DISE emphasizes human rights as a pillar of sustainable capacity building. 
Denmark acknowledges that persistent human-rights education, especially as part of 
justice- and security-sector reform, is necessary for long-term success.  
2. Key Tools  
To enable these approaches, DISE names six keys tools to be used in stabilization 
engagements:  
a. Negotiation 
The use of diplomacy, in support of negotiations and political settlements to 
potential or unfolding conflicts, is invaluable. The Danish diplomatic corps is involved 
with international and local networks that may identify the root causes of crises and 
promote dialogue “based on trust and understanding developed during a long-term 
presence.”7  
                                                 
7 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 16. 
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b. Development  
Denmark has a long tradition as a strong, credible development partner. These 
capabilities are given direction by the Danish development strategy, “The Right to a 
Better Life,” which centers on a “poverty-oriented development policy with a focus on 
human rights, democracy, green growth, employment and sustainable development.”8  
c. Military and Police  
The third and fourth tools, military and policy capabilities, support the 
development of self-sustaining justice and security sectors, which may be nonexistent or 
weak in a fragile state. Military capabilities may be used to provide security so that the 
work of other stabilization capabilities can proceed. In extreme situations, the military 
may participate in peacemaking—for example, directly combating insurgent forces on 
behalf of the state.  
d. Civilian Experts 
Civilians may supplement other capabilities by bringing special expertise. For 
example, Denmark has posted civilian experts to the Afghan ministry of education to 
guide its design. The Danish Peace and Stabilization Response, an organization 
controlled by the ministry of foreign affairs, coordinates these civilian capabilities.  
e. The Danish Emergency Management Agency  
Finally, use of the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), a civilian 
agency under the ministry of defense, may aid natural- and humanitarian disaster relief, 
both in the short term and in the long-term development of local emergency-management 
capabilities.  
3. Whole-of-Government Integration 
DISE stresses that these tools and capabilities must be integrated in a whole-of-
government approach as a priority. To this end, the government has established a 
                                                 
8 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 17. 
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committee to examine whole-of–government stabilization activities, comprising 
representatives from relevant ministries, to coordinate which capabilities to use where. 
The committee also determines the goals and strategies of a mission to ensure a unified 
effort. Likewise, at the tactical level, agencies must coordinate their efforts. For example, 
DISE calls for joint pre-mission training as well as coordination during mission 
execution. Because Denmark will rarely work alone in stabilization engagements, DISE 
emphasizes cooperation with international partners and organizations to achieve unity of 
effort. DISE specifically names the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), 
NATO, and Nordic Defense and Security Policy Cooperation (NORDEFCO) as 
important partners in stabilization. DISE draws on a global agreement among fragile and 
conflict-affected states, international development partners, and civil society, published 
as “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” to create a common vision.9 In addition, 
DISE emphasizes collaboration with regional organizations such as the Eastern Africa 
Standby Force (EASF), created by the African Union in July 2004.  
4. Goals and Ambitions  
The DISE document outlines the goals and ambitions that should frame Danish 
intervention in fragile countries.  
a. Prevention 
The foremost ambition is to prevent conflicts before they begin, with the goal of 
saving resources and obviating suffering; thus the root causes of a conflict must be 
identified before they erupt into open strife. Denmark divides its approach into two 
categories: regional, cross-borders efforts with long-term capability and capacity-building 
components that address the drivers of the conflict; and quick responses deployed when a 
conflict escalates unexpectedly. These efforts are reinforced by a fund of DDK 930 
million that the stabilization committee may use in support of either category. DISE 
                                                 
9 “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was crafted by the International Dialogue and signed 
by more than 40 countries and organizations at the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness on 30 
November 2011 in Busan, Korea. 
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stresses the need for pre-planning and cooperation between all relevant Danish 
departments, ministries, and capabilities to ensure quick responses.  
b. Sustainability 
Second, Denmark places great emphasis on efforts that lead to long-term 
sustainability for a local government. DISE stresses early dialogue and mutual 
understanding with local authorities to build sustainable capacities and institutions and 
create common, realistic goals. This process tends to generate local ownership of the 
stabilization process and create enduring results.  
c. Realistic Risk Assessment 
Third, DISE underlines the need for realistic, up-front risk assessment of 
stabilization initiatives. Stabilization is a complex endeavor, with no guarantee of 
success. Political leaders and stakeholders must acknowledge that political goals may be 
unattainable and investments may be lost. DISE discusses this uncertainty and the need 
for high flexibility and a willingness to allow actors on the ground to improvise. The 
fragile nature of the setting tends to increase security threats and physical risk to 
personnel—these risks must be weighed against the benefits of intervention. A shared 
understanding of risk is especially necessary among decision-makers, the public, and 
participants in the missions.10 
d. Analysis  
To ensure that proficiency in stabilization operations is rigorously developed, 
DISE calls for systematic evaluation and documentation of stabilization efforts. 
Initiatives to identify best practices and lessons are currently ongoing in the Stabilization 
Leader’s Discussion Forum, an assembly that analyzes recent engagements. The forum 
includes foreign stabilization leaders—for example, foreign affairs and defense ministers 
from Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and other Western countries. 
                                                 
10 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 21, 24, 36–37. 
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C. MAKING KEY TERMS OPERATIONAL 
For the analysis in this research, defining several key terms is needed. This 
section offers in-depth discussions and working definitions for stabilization engagements, 
the whole-of-government approach, goals and measures of effectiveness, and capacity- 
and state-building.  
1. Stabilization Engagements  
In defining stability engagements, it is important to distinguish between military 
definitions of stabilization operations and an integrated, whole-of-government concept. 
U.S. doctrine defines the military contribution to stabilization as activities to “protect and 
defend the population” and places stability operations as a subset of, for example, a larger 
counterinsurgency campaign.11 NATO doctrine considers military contribution to 
stabilization and reconstruction a subset of crisis-response operations, distinguishing it 
from other crisis responses such as counterinsurgency, peace support, and humanitarian 
assistance.12 The whole-of-government approach as described in DISE calls for whatever 
military means and methods are necessary to make a safe and secure environment, 
including non-military assets such as, for example, diplomats and experts in agricultural 
development.  
To refine the definition of stabilization engagements, it is necessary to look at 
those conflicts that require stabilization as a response. NATO defines a spectrum of 
conflict (see Figure 1), in which stabilization operations begin after major combat has 
ended and preventive stabilization efforts are linked to peace support.13  
                                                 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–07: Stability Operations (Washington, DC: USGPO, 
2011), vii-viii, accessed 01 December 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf. 
12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, AJP-3.4.5, NATO Doctrine, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) © 
NATO/OTAN, December 2015, IX, 1.1-1.3, http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/AJP-
3.4.5%20EDA%20V1%20E.pdf. 
13 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, AJP-3.4.1, NATO 




Figure 1.  NATO’s Spectrum of Conflict and Associated 
SOF Principal Tasks.14 
By contrast, DISE, like the British “building stability overseas strategy” (BSOS), 
defines integrated, whole-of-government engagement that uses diplomatic, development, 
and security efforts to bolster fragile states before, during, and after crises occur.15 Thus, 
in the context of a whole-of-government stabilization engagement, it is useful to expand 
the discussion of how stabilization proceeds across different kinds of conflicts, ranging 
from pre-conflict conditions, to intrastate conflict, to major state-on-state war, as shown 
in Table 2. 
                                                 
14 Source: NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, AJP-3.5 (NATO Doctrine, NATO 
Standardization Agency (NSA) © NATO/OTAN, December 2013), 1–3, 
http://nso.nato.int/nso/zPublic/ap/AJP-3.5%20EDA%20V1%20E.pdf. 
15 “Building Stability Overseas Strategy,” DFID, FCO, and MOD, 2011, 4–5.  
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Table 2.   Stabilization Engagements Across Different Kinds of Conflict. 
 
The different kinds of conflicts are shaded blue and the DISE focus is in red. 
In pre-conflict environments, a fragile government unable to provide services may 
lead to instability. A natural disaster may further aggravate this condition. The 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, for example, transformed a fragile state with weak governance into a 
massive humanitarian crisis.  
Internal, or intrastate, conflicts are another source of instability. The Taliban-led 
insurgency in Afghanistan that began in 1994 is an example of an irregular intrastate 
conflict that further destabilized a government. Whereas the intervention in Haiti focused 
on providing the government with services in the aftermath of an earthquake, the 
intervention in Afghanistan required the military to counter an insurgency and provide a 
safe and secure environment for building government services. 
State-on-state wars require a different approach. For example, the 2003 U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq began as a conventional state-on-state war that destabilized a government 
and employed a primarily military solution, at least initially. The intrastate conflict that 
emerged after the war required an international stabilization engagement with a strong 
and prolonged military presence. Thus, in state-on-state-conflict, a stabilization 
engagement becomes the means to ensure peace or solve an ensuing intrastate conflict. 
However, the stabilization effort may be initiated before the end of the state-on-state war.  
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In sum, stabilization engagements are not restricted to a certain type or duration of 
conflict. Military power may be necessary, but should be part of a whole-of-government 
approach that allows flexible strategies for countering instability. 
Based on the DISE, the following working definition is employed in this research: 
stabilization engagements are those that counter instability in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries, tailored to the situation using the necessary tools of government and focusing 
on durable, long-term efforts in pre-conflict and intrastate conflicts. 
2. The Whole-of-Government Approach  
The multifaceted problems of stabilization engagements exceed the capabilities of 
military forces working alone. The whole-of-government approach builds on stabilization 
operations in a more integrated, holistic way by involving multiple governmental 
departments and agencies.16 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), for example, defines a whole-of-government approach as 
one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks 
across the agencies within that government to co-ordinate the design and 
implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s 
agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those 
interventions in achieving the desired objectives.17  
Similarly, U.S. Joint Publication 3–07, Stability Operations, defines the whole-of-
government approach as one that “integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments 
and agencies of the USG (U.S. government) to achieve unity of effort toward a shared 
goal.”18 The diverse goals, incentives, capabilities, and interests of departments and 
agencies involved in stabilization efforts may hamper effective stabilization, particularly 
because of conflicting goals, poor communication, and weak coordination. Thus, it is 
important to establish a common framework for objectives in stabilization 
engagements.19  
                                                 
16 OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” OECD Journal on Development, 
Vol. 8/3, 2008, 199, accessed 20 November 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/journal_dev-v8-art39-en. 
17 OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 192. 
18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (JP 3–07), B-1. 
19 OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 196. 
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a. Primary Objectives 
The OECD stresses that the primary objectives should concern political, security, 
economic, and developmental issues, and describes a set of principles distilled from the 
experience of seven countries,20 including the following desiderata:  
 Efforts must be based on a common understanding of what a fragile state 
is. 
 Relevant government actors and agencies must be engaged as appropriate 
to the circumstances. 
 Joint analysis must be made to define overall objectives and assess, 
prioritize, and improve joint activities 
 Joint strategies, planning, monitoring, and evaluation for engagements 
must be practical and country specific. 
 Effective coordination between departments and ministries must be 
established, with a capable lead coordinator. 
 Resources can be aligned by creating the right incentive structures through 
a joint policy statement. 
 The creative use of methods and tools promotes joint efforts toward a 
common goal. 
 Partners must develop a shared information-management system.21 
b. International Peace Academy Recommended Actions 
A study by the International Peace Academy confirms OECD 
recommendations.22 Based on comparative assessments of seven leading donor 
governments engaged in fragile states, the publication examines government efforts to 
promote coherent policies in order to integrate their resources and political instruments. 
                                                 
20 OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 181. Countries include: Australia, 
France, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
21 OECD, “Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States,” 217–221. 
22 Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?—Assessing “Whole of 
Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York, NY: International Peace Academy, 2007), 3. 
Countries include: the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, France, and 
Sweden. 
 16
The report recommends a number of actions to donor governments, and include the 
following: 
 Committing to “honest national dialogue about how to balance and 
prioritize the multiple goals and objectives” 
 Encouraging the development of “a unified and country strategy for each 
fragile state” 
 Developing “an institutionalized, integrated system for early warning and 
assessment” 
 Making “pooled funding…contingent upon genuine agreement on 
strategic priorities set strategic priorities and joint oversight of 
implementation” 
 Not letting national “policies within donor governments preclude the 
harmonization of international efforts” 
 Aligning “whole of government approaches…with the priorities of local 
actors”23 
c. The German Approach 
Germany is also interested in learning how to intervene successfully in fragile 
states. A 2013 policy paper published by the Brandenburg Institute for Society and 
Security analyzes the engagements of four governments—the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Canada, and Australia—in fragile and conflict-affected states to provide 
recommendations for improving the German approach. It is suggested that the German 
government should follow example nations in creating a high inter-ministerial board to 
oversee and coordinate engagements and an inter-ministerial unit to monitor, analyze, 
and provide crisis response to support the ministries. They recommend a jointly 
administered fund for conflict prevention, crisis response, and peace building. They also 
call for strategies to coordinate diplomatic, developmental, and security objectives by 
                                                 
23 Patrick and Brown, Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts?, 139–144. 
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encouraging cooperation across the government and including outside experts in 
policymaking.24 
All these reports recommend a joint and integrated approach, based on dialog, to 
promote cooperation among departments and ministries. This can be difficult. In a book 
on the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. 
Trainor detail the troubled cooperation and information sharing among the senior 
officials of the National Security Council (NSC). Former secretary of defense Donald 
Rumsfeld played a vital role in planning the invasion. According to Gordon and Trainor’s 
research, “Rumsfeld fully understood the weakness of the NSC system and took 
advantage of it,” because “[information] was power, and Rumsfeld did his best to control 
the flow.”25 The authors claim that this had a deleterious influence in the relationship 
between Rumsfeld and secretary of state Colin L. Powell and in their implementation of a 
post-invasion phase.  
d. The British Example 
A good example of a whole-of-government approach—perhaps the best 
example—comes from the United Kingdom. In 2007, the British created an integrated 
civil–military operational unit, or stabilization unit, “designed to be agile, responsive, and 
well-equipped to operate in high threat and high risk environments.”26 The unit, funded 
by conflict, stability, and security funding and reporting to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense, and Department of International 
Development, integrates civilian expertise with police and military personnel, and 
“increasingly delivers UK support to multilateral efforts in conflict prevention, 
                                                 
24 Alexis Below and Anne-Sophie Belzille, “Comparing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile 
States,” Potsdam: Brandenburgisches Institute für Gesellschaft und Sicherheit gGmbH/Brandenburg 
Institute for Society and Security (BIGS Policy Paper No. 3), May 2013, 4, http://www.bigs-
potsdam.org/images/Policy%20Paper/BIGS%20Policy%20Paper%20No.%203%20Fragile%20States%20D
ruckversion.pdf. 
25 Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and 
Occupation of Iraq (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2006), 169. 
26 Stabilisation Unit—Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), “Stabilisation,” CSSF Thematic 
Information Paper, (Stabilisation Unit: London, 180914), 2, accessed 12 February 2016, 
http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/images/supub/downloads/cssf-tips-stabilisation.pdf. 
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stabilisation, statebuilding and peace building.”27 In 2011, the unit was engaged in Libya, 
where it developed relationships with “people at all levels within the infrastructure and 
utilities sectors.”28 Their task was to “feed back information to the international bodies to 
help them understand the situation on the ground and understand what the Libyans really 
need to keep the water supply running.”29 In Somalia in 2012, the unit  
facilitated a number of key engagements with leaders of militia groups, the 
Somali government, representatives of the AU [African Union] force, the 
regional body, IGAD [Intergovernmental Authority on Development], and 
the UN—to maintain momentum for the fragile agreement.30 
e. Best Practices for Preventive Action 
In an attempt to respond proactively to violent conflicts early in the process, 
international actors have developed warning systems to prevent full-scale conflicts from 
erupting and reduce costs in lives and material support. Measures aimed at preventing 
full-scale conflicts include  
 Understanding the problem 
 Ensuring that responses are diverse, flexible, and sustainable 
 Investing time in planning and strategy 
 Being conflict-sensitive (i.e., an organization should understand the 
context of a conflict) 
 Not pushing technical solutions onto political problems 
 Balancing speed, ownership, and coordination31  
To support these best practices, several specific considerations are required.  
                                                 
27 Stabilisation Unit—Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), “Stabilisation,” 2. 
28 Victoria King, “Stabilisation Unit: UK civilians working amid conflict,” BBC News, 11 October, 
2011, accessed February 22, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-14763483. 
29 Victoria King, “Stabilisation Unit: UK civilians working amid conflict,” BBC News. 
30 Systems Consultants Services Ltd (SCS), “The UK’s Renewed Efforts at Stabilisation,” (SCS: 
Reading, 15 December 2015), accessed 22 February 2016, http://www.scs-ltd.co.uk/news/the-uks-renewed-
efforts-at-stabilisation/. 
31 OECD (2009), Preventing Violence, War, and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early 
Warning and Response, Conflict and Fragility (OECD Publishing, Paris, France, 2009), 100, accessed 25 
November 2015, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264059818-en. 
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(1) Eyewitness Intelligence 
To take appropriate action, decision makers need accurate, timely information 
about the situation on the ground. Though modern technology can provide much 
information, it is crucial that eyewitnesses onsite confirm assessments, because decisions 
made on misinformation may be counterproductive, injurious, or fatal. It is furthermore 
important to respond to problems with a robust set of political tools, whether economic, 
development, diplomatic, or military, and to focus on long-term solutions, recognizing 
complexity and being willing to invest considerable time. Finally, it is important overall 
to create a comprehensive and coherent strategy. 
(2) Alignment of Resources 
DISE stresses the need for joint training among governmental organizations as a 
strategy to prepare for preventive engagements. A 2009 report by the Danish Institute for 
International Studies (DIIS) echoes this point and proposes improving Danish civil and 
military coordination by analyzing the approaches of the Netherlands and United 
Kingdom, which boast advanced interagency collaboration. The report stresses the 
importance of civil and military personnel participating in joint national and 
multinational exercises as a necessary means of improving interagency coordination and 
collaboration.32 The DIIS report notes that a stabilization unit like the UK’s could 
“facilitate more systematic cooperation at the operational level, filling an operational gap 
between development efforts, military campaigns and national-level political 
initiatives.”33 
                                                 
32 Finn Sepputat, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), “Integrated National Approaches to 
International Operations: The Cases of Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands,” DIIS Report 2009, 
(Copenhagen: DIIS, 2009), 14, 
https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import_efter1114/diis_report_2009_14_integrated_national_a
pproaches_international_operations_web.pdf. 
33 DIIS Report 2009, “Integrated National Approaches to International Operations,” 63. 
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(3) Coordination Among Partners 
Another issue concerns “close cooperation with our international partners,”34 
which may be governmental or non-governmental organizations. A 2014 study from the 
Centre for Military Studies, which analyzes cooperation among international 
organizations during complex emergency actions in East Africa, provides an example of 
poor coordination. The sheer number of countries, agencies and actors, which differed in 
size, resources, motivation, and willingness to cooperate, was staggering, as were the 
divisions between government and non-governmental organizations and for-profit and 
non-profit organizations.35 The report suggests that Denmark should take a leading role 
in coordinating multinational operations to increase its influence for optimal use of 
foreign aid36 and use, for example, International Dialogue on Peace and Statebuilding 
(International Dialogue), a political forum that links fragile and conflict-affected 
countries with development partners and NGOs.37 
(4) Prevention as a Priority 
DISE, the BSOS, and U.S. national-security strategy stress the importance of 
preventive actions, including diplomatic, development, and security measures as 
appropriate. A donor nation should develop an early warning system to detect developing 
conflicts in fragile states and prepare the instruments needed for a timely preventive 
response. 
Findings and recommendations concerning the whole-of-government approach 
stress the need for joint and integrated policies that harness relevant governmental 
                                                 
34 Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 9. 
35 Flemming Pradhan-Blach, Gary Schaub Jr., Matthew LeRiche, “Cooperation between International 
Organizations in Complex Emergencies in Eastern Africa,” (Copenhagen: Centre for Military Studies, 
University of Copenhagen, January 2014), 11, accessed 06 May 2016, 
http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/complexemergencies/Cooperation_between_International_Organizati
ons_in_Complex_Emergencies_in_Eastern_Africa.pdf. 
36 Pradhan-Blach et al., “Cooperation between International Organizations in Complex Emergencies 
in Eastern Africa,” 21. 
37 International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (International Dialogue), “About the 
International Dialogue,” accessed 05 May 2016, http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/id/about-international-
dialogue/. 
 21
agencies for each country-specific case. Common goals and objectives, alignment of 
resources, preventive measures, coordination between departments and ministries, and 
high political priority and focus are imperative. 
3. Goals and Measurements of Success 
DISE addresses a need to identify goals and measurements of success in stability 
operations; nevertheless, how to do this may be difficult to answer. Goals will vary 
depending on the problem and stakeholders involved—they must be identified on a case-
by-case basis.  
a. Benchmarks 
A 2006 United States Institute of Peace study led by stabilization analyst Craig 
Cohen supports DISE in advocating goals based on analysis of those factors that are 
driving the conflict and instability in a given situation.38 Cohen proposes measurements 
of success that allow stakeholders to create benchmark goals and develop clear methods 
of evaluating progress. Clear-cut indicators must be provided that accurately gauge the 
“ability to reduce means and motivation for violent conflict in a society and to build local 
and state capacity to sustain peace.”39 These measurements should be adjustable to reflect 
developments on the grounds that challenge the original intentions of the intervention.40  
b. Social Criteria 
Another approach to setting goals and measuring success comes from U.S. 
insurgency analyst Andrew Krepinevich, who emphasizes winning the population, as 
opposed to destroying the enemy. Krepinevich’s measures of success include criteria 
such as political participation and social reforms. By this reckoning, a kinetic focus of 
                                                 
38 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Series No.1 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 3, accessed 14 
January 2016, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/srs1.pdf. 
39 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress,” 1, 11–12. 
40 Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress,” 1. 
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neutralizing the opposition is less important than addressing the grievances of the people 
and winning them over to the government side.41 
c. Risk Assessment 
In addition to identifying goals and devising ways of measuring effectiveness, 
DISE calls for pre-deployment assessment of risk, stressing cognizance of two factors: 
risk to outcomes and risk to the actors on the ground. These risks are defined both 
politically and operationally. Risk to outcome concerns the success of the mission. If 
success criteria are not met, decision makers face the political risk of flagging public 
support for the mission and their overall policy; in terms of the operation itself, failed 
policies may drive a contested population to support state adversaries. Risk to the actors 
on the ground include, most importantly, the wounding or killing of Danish soldiers and 
civilians, which may also deflate public support. Operationally, fatalities conduce to 
lower morale and a slower operational tempo for the actors on the ground. 
4. Capacity- and State-Building  
A government has core functions it must fulfill to maintain a safe and secure 
environment for the population. Failure to provide basic services may lead to intrastate 
conflict, terrorist safe havens, massive refugee flows, and regional instability. External 
actors may intervene to build the capacity of the government, strengthen civil society, 
and amend deficiencies in the state—this is capacity- and state-building, or “an 
endogenous process of strengthening the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state 
driven by state-society relations.”42 
a. The OECD Definition 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development defines capacity 
development as  
                                                 
41 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, ML: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 10–12. 
42 OECD (2011), “International Engagement in Fragile States: Can We Do Better?,” Conflict and 
Fragility, OECD Publishing, 60, accessed 25 November 2015, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264086128-en. 
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the process by which individuals, groups, and organizations, institutions 
and countries develop, enhance and organize their systems, resources and 
knowledge: all reflected in their abilities, individually and collectively, to 
perform functions, solve problems and achieve objectives.43  
Based on four decades of experience, evaluation, and analysis by bi- and 
multilateral donors, the OECD provides a framework for capacity development in a 2008 
report affirming capacity building as critical in fragile states44 and recommending that 
efforts focus on core state functions to create a minimum level of effectiveness. Besides 
macroeconomic and public financial management, capacity building also includes restoring 
essential services and security.45 External supporters should respect the context of local 
institutions and social capital and the informal norms and rules that govern society and 
build trust. Focused on long-term gains, progress should be allowed to unfold gradually; 
external models for capacity building should not be forced upon existing structures.46 
b. The Ghani and Lockhart Framework  
Some practitioners offer guidelines for effective state-building. For example, 
Ghani and Lockhart offer a framework of ten functions that a state must perform, as 
follows:  
 Rule of law 
 A monopoly on the legitimate means of violence 
 Administrative control 
 Sound management of public finances 
 Investment in human capital 
 Creation of citizenship rights through social policy 
 Infrastructure services 
                                                 
43 OECD (2011), “International Engagement in Fragile States: Can We Do Better?” 59. 
44 OECD, “The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Toward Good Practice,” OECD 
Journal on Development, Vol. 8/3, 243, accessed 25 November 2015, DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/journal_dev-v8-art40-en. 
45 OECD, “The Challenge of Capacity Development,” 268. 
46 OECD, “The Challenge of Capacity Development,” 269. 
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 Commercial markets 
 Proper management of public assets 
 Effective public borrowing47 
The authors argue that these functions are necessary for a state to function in the 
international arena. While they constitute a general plan by which to initiate state- 
building,  
Consensus on these functions would allow the delineation of each function 
through a capacity-building program with timelines, benchmarks and 
indicators that serve both as goals toward which the public can be 
mobilized, and also as a means of accounting by which the momentum 
and achievements of the program can be reported to the public.48  
In other words, for a framework to be an effective instrument in state-building, it 
must include goals with clearly defined objectives and a “step-by-step plan for 
operationalizing these goals.”49 
c. The United States Institute for Peace Framework  
The United States Institute of Peace outlines another framework for successful 
state-building, developed to make the process simpler and more flexible. The institute 
names five desired outcomes for post-conflict countries, as follows: 
 A safe and secure environment 
 Rule of law 
 Stable democracy 
 A sustainable economy 
 Social well-being50  
                                                 
47 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
125–160. 
48 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach 
to State-Building,” Working Paper 253, (London: Overseas Development Institute, September 2005), 9, 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2482.pdf. 
49 Clare Lockhart, Director, The Institute for State Effectiveness, Prepared Testimony: Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, September 17 2009, 1. 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LockhartTestimony090917a1.pdf. 
 25
These end-states are interconnected and mutually influential. Each end-state 
contains measurable and well-defined objectives to promote a structured process and 
enhance the chances for a successful intervention.51  
The framework stresses leadership responsibilities across all end-states for the 
successful development of a state and the overseeing of the process. The point of strong 
leadership is to create unity of purpose among the organizations involved, including 
military officials, NGOs, international organizations, government authorities, and the 
private sector. Leaders should develop and integrate plans, ensure sufficient authority, 
“build and maintain legitimacy,” “engage the international community,” and “build 
constituencies for peace.”52 All organizations, public or private, need leadership to 
function well; history provides countless examples in which leadership was critical, and 
many efforts at state-building have failed due to its absence, with the former-Yugoslavia, 
South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Somalia providing recent examples. If responsible 
leadership is lacking from state-building, success is impossible and the engagement may 
be protracted. 
d. Balancing Dilemmas 
One of the key challenges of state-building is balancing military involvement with 
other governmental efforts. Political scientist David Edelstein describes the dilemma of 
military intervention as a state-building tool, specifically the duration and footprint 
dilemmas.53 Edelstein argues that a large force might well accomplish security goals, but 
at the risk of alienating the people by appearing as intruders and by forcing military 
solutions on problems perceived as non-military. A smaller force might be more 
                                                                                                                                                 
50 Robert M. Perito, “United States Institute of Peace Framework for Societies Emerging from 
Conflict,” in Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations, ed. Robert M. Perito, 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 01 June 2007), xxxiv.  
51 Robert M. Perito, “United States Institute of Peace Framework for Societies Emerging from 
Conflict,” xxxiv-xxxv. 
52 Robert M. Perito, “United States Institute of Peace Framework for Societies Emerging from 
Conflict,” xxxvi. 
53 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” in The 
Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris 
and Timothy D. Risk, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 81. 
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successful, appearing less invasive and allowing elements of indigenous national power 
to have a voice.54 The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, illustrate the 
dilemmas of employing a relatively light footprint (in Afghanistan) and a large footprint 
(in Iraq).  
[Afghanistan has to] some extent avoided provoking nationalist resistance, 
but at the cost of limited control over Afghanistan’s more remote 
provinces. In Iraq, the U.S.-led coalition attempted to be more assertive in 
taking control of the country, but the visible and intrusive presence 
generated costly resistance that made the tasks of postwar state building 
more difficult.55  
The size of a given intervening force is a dilemma that must take a number of 
factors into consideration—among them, time available, financial and human costs, 
preexisting collaborations between government ministries and the military, the security 
situation on the ground, and the local perception of a foreign military’s presence.56 
Staying too long in a fragile state invites resistance from the host population. Thus, the 
dilemma is between staying long enough to build a sustainable state and leaving too soon 
and risking a resurgence of the conflict.57 
e. Cultural Awareness as a Factor 
Cultural awareness of a host nation’s customs, values, religions, language, and 
rituals are important to success in fragile states that are significantly different from 
Western. Because the conflicts involved are population centered, gaining the people’s 
trust and respect is critical. The U.S. military’s joint publication Stability Operations 
argues that disregard for local customs and religion may increase tension and resistance 
toward allied forces and efforts.  
Cultural awareness and sensitivity are necessary to dispel the natural 
tensions that arise when external authorities dictate the terms and 
conditions of SSR [security, stability, and reconstruction] for the HN [host 
                                                 
54 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 90. 
55 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 93. 
56 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 90. 
57 David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar Statebuilding,” 84. 
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nation]. Responsiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to local culture help 
limit resentment and resistance to reform while generating local solutions 
to local problems.58  
Developing cultural understanding among those deployed not only helps the 
overall success of a mission, it may also defend the safety of those deployed. Cultural 
awareness is especially essential in a counterinsurgency, where information and support 
from the populace is vital. 
Engaging in capacity- and state-building in a fragile state is complex and difficult. 
It involves focusing on the core functions of a state, such as security, a justice system, 
viable governmental institutions, and a liberal economy. However, success requires the 
joint engagement of donor countries—not just at the national, but the international level. 
It requires working with the host nation and developing the trust of the people. 
D. FACTORS UNDERREPRESENTED IN DISE 
1. Intelligence 
A critical factor that receives little discussion in DISE is intelligence. Military 
intelligence, for example, uses a variety of intelligence tools. Some depend on 
technology, such as imagery intelligence (IMINT), which studies and interprets pictures, 
or signal intelligence (SIGINT), which monitors and exploits signal systems. Other tools 
may rely on human sensors, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), in which human 
operators gather intelligence themselves or through mediators.59 
a. Focus on the Population 
In conventional combat operations, the intelligence focus is on revealing the 
enemy’s force structure and anticipating his intentions on the battlefield. To that end, the 
military-intelligence effort relies heavily on IMINT, including unmanned, aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), satellites, and other platforms, or on SIGINT monitoring of the enemy’s 
communications. By contrast, in stabilization engagements, intelligence should focus on 
                                                 
58 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations (JP 3–07), C-18. 
59 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–00: Joint Intelligence (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2013), 
B1-B6, accessed 29 January 2016,  http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp2_0.pdf. 
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the population, whose support is the key to success. In a counterinsurgency stabilization 
engagement, insurgent infrastructure—meaning the ways the insurgents can gain 
financing, supplies, shelter, recruits, intelligence, and freedom of movement through the 
population—is of paramount interest. Intelligence should also focus on popular needs and 
vulnerabilities to allow government to meet these needs specifically and thus drive a 
wedge between the insurgents and the population.60  
The same principle applies to engagements in fragile states where conflict has not 
erupted. To arrest further destabilization or conflict emergence, intelligence should focus 
on infrastructure, the population, and other vulnerabilities that criminals or potential 
insurgents may exploit. Lieutenant Colonel David Galula of the French army 
recommends a focus on the population in insurgencies, based on his experiences from 
WWII and irregular wars in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria.61 Galula provides 
laws and principles for fighting insurgency, emphasizing that the population is the 
objective in a counterinsurgency: “[the insurgents] will win the war because, in the final 
analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the 
population or, at worst, on its submissiveness.”62 In defeating an insurgency, Galula 
observes that intelligence about the insurgency has to come from the locals, but if the 
people do not feel safe, they will not talk.63 Understanding the people and enemy is not 
easily achieved by technological tools alone; these should be used to supplement 
HUMINT, which remains the central effort.64 
b. Use of Indigenous Police Forces 
Military intelligence units and personnel are proficient in HUMINT, particularly 
those within special-operations forces, and have experience in low-intensity conflicts. For 
                                                 
60 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 10–11, 227–229. 
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62 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 4. 
63 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 50. 
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this reason, the military is a valuable intelligence-gathering tool in stabilization 
engagements. However, as a RAND study on the Malayan insurgency argues, military 
intelligence generally fails to capture deep knowledge of the adversary’s infrastructure or 
the population; police forces are better trained for this, and police knowledge, experience, 
and daily interactions with the people make them the ideal HUMINT tool in stabilization 
engagements.65  
c. Cultural Intelligence  
Cultural intelligence adds needed depth in understanding a local environment. 
U.S. Navy intelligence analyst John Coles defines cultural intelligence as a holistic 
“analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides 
understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as 
religion), and behaviors.”66 This knowledge is essential for decision makers who 
maneuver not only against adversaries, but also with “coalitions, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), host nations, and other 
regional power brokers.”67  
In sum, intelligence activities in stabilization engagements should focus on the 
population and insurgent infrastructure in an attempt to facilitate the alienation of the 
population from potential or actual anti-state forces. This focus should be reinforced by a 
strong emphasis on using the HUMINT skills of the local police. 
2. Information Operations 
Information operations is another topic on which DISE does not provide 
guidance. Nevertheless, historical stabilization efforts from Malaysia to Afghanistan 
suggest that information operations are key in alienating anti-state adversaries from the 
population and persuading international stakeholders. In the Malayan counterinsurgency 
                                                 
65 R.W Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect” (Santa Monica, CA: Report for RAND, 
1972), 38, 41–45. 
 66 John P. Coles, “Cultural Intelligence & Joint Intelligence Doctrine,” The Air University, accessed 
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campaign of 1948–1960, for example, government information operations ranged from 
assuring insurgents that they could surrender without repercussions to disseminating 
information on current developments and the consequences of cooperating with the 
insurgency.68 
NATO defines information operations as the “coordination of military 
information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and 
capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC-approved parties69 in 
support of alliance mission objectives.”70 This focus on the adversary, however, is linked 
to conventional state-on-state conflict. In stabilization engagements, the adversary is 
unquestionably important, but a more holistic focus on all actors in the environment, with 
special attention to the population, is required.  
Furthermore, in whole-of-government stabilization, military information 
operations should be subordinate to what this capstone refers to as “information 
activities,” which consist of whole-of-government efforts to inform and influence a target 
audience. The military framework uses public affairs (PA), an information-operations-
related field, to educate a population factually about events with the goal of gaining 
public support. To further influence and inform target audiences, the military uses a 
variety of information-operation capabilities, including psychological operations 
(PSYOP), deception, key leadership engagements (KLE) and civil–military cooperation 
(CIMIC). PSYOP seeks to influence by encouraging behaviors favorable to force 
objectives, through a variety of media sources and face-to-face contact; deception 
misleads adversaries by feeding them false or manipulated information; KLE engages 
leading members of different entities to inform and influence them; CIMIC fosters 
relationships among the military, civilian agencies and the local population to catalyze 
                                                 
68 Komer, “The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect,” 69–71. 
69 Adversaries, potential adversaries, decision makers, cultural groups, elements of the international 
community and others who may be informed by Alliance information activities. 
70 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, (AJP-3.10) NATO Doctrine, NATO 
Standardization Agency (NSA) © NATO/OTAN, November 2009, 1.3, accessed 01 December 2015, 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-IO.pdf. 
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military operations.71 The NATO doctrine is quick to point out that CIMIC must be used 
cautiously to avoid compromising military credibility in the relationship.72 
Within the overall discussion, it is important to note that counter-state adversaries 
have their own information activities. These adversaries may be physically weak but 
proficient at using information activities to gain popular support. Insurgents have the 
advantage of direct access to and a keen understanding of the population, and can exploit 
modern information channels. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, insurgents have used 
the Internet to show videos of their tactical success on the battlefield.73 The state’s 
information activities should counter adversarial messages and deliver content of its own 
as a non-kinetic means of eroding support for adversaries.74 To that end, the information 
activities should be closely linked to other stabilization efforts employed.75 
Militaries have logged much experience in information operations employed 
toward stabilization over the last decades. The military functions and capabilities of 
information activities may support other whole-of-government agencies and encourage 
an efficient, combined effort. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The principles and tools described in this chapter are culled from the findings, 
recommendations, and conclusions of diverse international reports, including the OECD 
and RAND. They identify the importance of a holistic, joint approach to stabilization for 
optimal success. This includes greater cooperation and coordination among civilian and 
military entities within the government. The focus of stabilization should be providing 
security to the population and empowering the host nation to develop a sustainable 
environment with effective institutions. Where possible, early intervention may forestall 
                                                 
71 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, (AJP-3.10), 1.8—1.13. 
72 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, (AJP-3.10), 1.12. 
73 Norman E. Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations: Understanding the Role of People, 
Capabilities, and Effects,” Military Review, November-December 2008, 28. 
74 Trond Gimmingsrud and Hans-Marius Pedersen, “Small nation, big difference: How the Norwegian 
Armed Forces should conduct counterinsurgency operations,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2009, 37–44, 
accessed 01 December 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a501165.pdf. 
75 Emery, “Irregular Warfare Information Operations,” 28. 
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the escalation of a conflict; however, when deploying military forces, it is essential to 
conduct thorough assessments of how the intervention may be perceived and the general 
security situation in the host country. This information is used to estimate the likely scope 
and duration of military intervention, bearing in mind that an overt military presence may 
have undesirable consequences in the security environment. A joint plan, including 
realistic goals and measurement of success, is essential in assessing whether the 
intentions and effort represented by an international intervention are justified. Finally, it 
is noted that DISE fails to emphasize intelligence capabilities and information operations, 
two important factors in the stabilization arena.  
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III. DANISH SOF 
This chapter examines Danish special operations forces (DANSOF), comparing 
the demands of DISE with the capabilities DANSOF provides. An overview of 
international and DANSOF doctrines and a discussion of DANSOF capabilities and 
organization are presented, with a summary of DANSOF deployment in Afghanistan as a 
case study. The chapter also considers best SOF practices, based on DANSOF 
deployment and the partnership capacity of international SOF units.  
Ultimately, this capstone proposes that SOF characteristics and capabilities make 
them suitable for whole-of-government stabilization engagements, especially given their 
ability to deploy rapidly and operate in small groups with minimal logistical support and 
their unique adaptability in new or insecure environments. These capabilities are key in 
both prevention and active conflicts.  
A. SOF DOCTRINE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
On the premise that the Danish armed forces work mostly in combination with 
allied countries, DANSOF uses NATO doctrine for its primary guidelines, supplemented 
by U.S. and UN doctrine as required. This section compares and analyses NATO and 
U.S. doctrines in order to suggest how this, being Denmark’s combined SOF doctrine, 
supports stabilization engagements.  
1. SOF in NATO Doctrine 
NATO doctrine describes the three main tasks of SOF as direct action (DA), 
special reconnaissance (SR), and military assistance (MA).  
DA is precise, offensive operations against well-defined targets to destroy, 
capture, or recover an objective.  
SR is operations to gather intelligence in support of subsequent actions.  
MA activities support friendly assets and include capacity-building assistance for 
indigenous security forces, engagement with leadership, and civic actions to 
 34
influence the population.76 An important element in MA is contact with useful 
factions—that is, liaison efforts with various local factions to gather intelligence 
and understand the local situation.77  
In the Danish context, other SOF tasks include protection of important personnel 
such as ambassadors or ministerial staff and special assistance to the Danish police.  
DA, SR, and MA support various NATO activities related to stabilization 
engagements:78  
Counterinsurgency (COIN), which is “the set of political, economic, social, 
military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities with the aim to defeat 
insurgency and address any core grievances”79  
Counterterrorism (CT), or offensive measures to counter the vulnerability of 
allied interests, individuals, and forces to terrorism 
Countering weapons of mass destruction, which is to disable and prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [check] 
Hostage-release operations (HRO), that is, operations to recapture personnel, 
facilities or sensitive materiel 
2. Additional U.S. Core Tasks 
In U.S. doctrine, internal defense and development (IDAD) is a full measure of 
the steps taken by host nation, “focus[ing] on building viable political, economic, 
military, and social institutions” to “prevent an insurgency or other forms of 
lawlessness or subversion.”80 As such, IDAD reflects the intention of stabilization 
engagements as laid out in DISE. 
U.S. doctrine defines additional SOF core tasks that may be used in stabilization 
engagements, whether led by SOF or supported: 
                                                 
76 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5), 2–1 – 
2–4. 
77 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5), 2–5. 
AJP 3–5 uses the term “faction liaison’. 
78 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5), 2–4—
2–5. 
79 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4), 
(NATO Doctrine, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) © NATO/OTAN, February 2011), 1–2 – 1–3. 
80 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–22: Foreign Internal Defense (Washington, DC: 
USGPO, 12 July 2010), II—1. 
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a. Foreign Internal Defense 
Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host nation’s IDAD to counter internal 
threats to security and stability, training and developing host capabilities 
involving “integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power,” 
and addressing the root causes of instability.81  
FID, when described from a U.S. military perspective, most closely approximates 
a combination of NATO’s doctrine on military contribution to stabilization and 
reconstruction (MCSR) and the intrastate content of military contribution to peace 
support (MCPS). MCSR varies from providing security to fostering justice to facilitating 
livelihoods in unstable states during and after a crisis, using a comprehensive and 
integrated international response.82 MCPS includes “efforts conducted impartially to 
restore or maintain peace. Peace support efforts may include conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peace building.”83  
U.S. SOF doctrine provides more detail than its NATO counterpart in describing 
how SOF core tasks may supplement or support a host nation’s IDAD and FID efforts. 
Direct action, special reconnaissance, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, hostage 
rescue and recovery (HRR) and countering weapons of mass destruction for all practical 
purposes replicates their NATO doctrinal equivalent, as described earlier. However, the 
designations of security-force assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, military 
information-support operations, and civil-affairs operations are of note. 
b. Security-Force Assistance 
Security-force assistance (SFA), when used to support FID, focuses on 
developing a host nation’s security sector in order to counter internal and transnational 
security threats. As such, it is closely related to NATO military assistance.  
                                                 
81 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, (JP 3–22), x. 
82 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, (AJP-3.4.5), 1–1. 
83 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace 
Support, (AJP-3.4.1) (NATO Doctrine, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) © NATO/OTAN, December 
2014), 1–2. 
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c. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) aims to reduce human suffering, disease, 
and hunger in disaster areas. It is usually carried out by a government agency in the 
framework of an international organization such as the United Nations. This is similar to 
NATO humanitarian assistance, which is defined as “aid provided to a crisis-affected 
population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a 
crisis affected population.”84  
d. Military Information-Support Operations 
Military information-support operations (MISO) seek to influence a specific 
target audience, primarily through messaging, and are coordinated with other security-
related activities. This function is reflected in NATO’s definition of information 
operations, which is the “coordination of military information activities in order to create 
desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential 
adversaries and other NAC-approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”85  
e. Civil-Affairs Operations  
Civil-affairs operations (CAO), when used in FID, “facilitate the integration of 
U.S. military support into the overall IDAD programs of the supported nation”86 and 
address underlying causes of instability, particularly in civil society.87 NATO doctrine 
lacks a direct equivalent, because this crucial integration is expected to take place at all 
levels among military and civilian agencies.  
                                                 
84 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, (AJP-3.4.5), 1–2. 
85 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, (AJP-3.10), 
1.3. 
86 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, (JP 3–22), I – 15. 
87 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–05: Special Operations (Washington, DC: USGPO, 
16 July 2014), II-16—18.  
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3. DANSOF Core Tasks  
While countering weapons of mass destruction, CT, and HRO may all be a part of 
stabilization engagements, they are not the focus of the DISE policy. Therefore, this 
study concentrates on DANSOF’s contribution to the NATO tasks identified, namely, 
DA, SR, MA, MCPS, MCSR, HA, COIN, IO and their U.S. equivalents. Table 3 provides 
a comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF doctrines. The focus of DISE policy is shaded 
gray. 
Table 3.   Comparison of NATO and U.S. SOF Doctrine Applicable to 
Stabilization Engagements.88 
 
                                                 
88 Adapted from: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 
(AJP-3.5); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4); 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and 
Reconstruction, (AJP-3.4.5); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military 
Contribution to Peace Support, (AJP-3.4.1); North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Information Operations, (AJP-3.10); U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Internal Defense, (JP 3–22); U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Joint Publication, (JP 3–05). 
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SOF tasks may be conducted through joint-military service efforts; DANSOF may 
be deployed from the sea, air, and land, using parachutes, helicopters, fixed-winged 
aircraft, ships, boats, a variety of motor vehicles, and animal transport. Thus, DANSOF is 
ideal for reaching remote places quickly and, if need be, with a small footprint. DANSOF 
training equips the force to work in all environments, from deserts to tropical rain forests 
or the arctic. 
Because SOF is a limited resource, it is important to use this tool where it has the 
potential for greatest impact. This may be at the strategic or operational levels, where 
SOF can support, facilitate, or duplicate other whole-of-government tools, or in tactical 
missions where the completion or sensitivity of a task has significant political 
implications.89 
4. SOF Distinctive Characteristics 
In an environment where the wrong focus can derail an entire engagement, how 
tasks are performed, and how efficiently, is at least as important as what a force can do. 
Danish special-operations researchers Anton Johnson and Gitte Christensen distinguish 
two key characteristics of SOF to emphasize what sets SOF apart from other military 
units: tactical superiority, a military characteristic in which SOF excels, as compared with 
conventional forces; and innovative90 mindset, which sets SOF apart from a conventional 
military context and allows creative, unexpected and cross-institutional solutions.91 These 
categories are further elaborated in combination with the SOF doctrine: 
a. Tactical Superiority 
(1) Quickly Deployable 
SOF units are quickly deployable because they are relatively few in number and 
require less logistics than conventional forces. As described earlier, SOF forces are also 
                                                 
89 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, (AJP-3.5), 1–6, 
2–1. 
90 Anton Asklund Johnson and Gitte Høtstrup Christensen use the word “anti-systemic” throughout 
their article. 
91 Anton Asklund Johnson and Gitte Høtstrup Christensen, “Clarifying the Anti-Systemic Elements of 
Special Operations: a Conceptual Inquiry” (Special Operations Journal, not yet published), 2–3. 
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able to deploy faster and through a variety of means, making them a quick-reaction 
force.92 
(2) Indirect and Balanced Approach 
Extensive weapons and tactic training, combined with sophisticated technology, 
allows SOF to work in uncertain or hostile areas more effectively than other forces, 
providing better security for service members and agencies. SOF training in cultural 
awareness, combined with the mature, reflective nature characteristic of SOF operators, 
may often yield an indirect, non-confrontational solution to an insecure or sensitive 
situation. These two aspects of SOF are important tools in decreasing personnel and 
political risk. 
(3) Precise and Discreet 
SOF methods and weapons allow very precise solutions that may minimize 
collateral damage. In addition, the small size and advanced skills of SOF allow them to 
work under the radar and perform discreetly, minimizing political risk. 
b. Innovative Mindset 
(1) Adaptable 
Contrary to their popular image, SOF operators are not primarily aggressive, 
assault-oriented personnel, but older, mature, experienced personnel, often with families. 
Danish SOF operators are selected with a strong emphasis on a balanced and empathetic 
mindset. This mentality makes SOF members reflective by nature and sensitive to the 
politics and cultural challenges of uncertain environments. Combined with an ad-hoc 
organization that promotes adaptability and creativity, SOF forces are an ideal tool for 
complex, uncertain, or fast-changing environments. Adaptability is a significant asset in 
                                                 
92 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Military Affairs, “United Nations 
Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual” (DPKO Doctrine, 2015), 11, 
http://dag.un.org/handle/11176/89590. 
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pre-mission planning, where SOF tailors itself to the task at hand, and also in response to 
swiftly evolving situations in the mission area.93 
(2) Cross-Institutional 
Cross-institutional functionality is an important SOF benefit.94 As part of both 
doctrine and training, SOF integrates army, navy, air force, interagency, and indigenous 
forces.95 Supplementing this integration, SOF may also perform tasks on a limited basis 
for other agencies. For example, SOF is trained in specialized intelligence collection, 
diplomatic engagements, and other forms of key leadership engagement. This makes SOF 
ideal for first-in deployment, because it can step in for other agencies (to some degree) 
until the security environment allows agency personnel to take over. In cases where 
capabilities and tasks are too sensitive or complex to hand over to special forces, SOF’s 
interagency training allows it to support the agency’s deployment, security, and mission 
execution. 
(3) Exploring the Unthinkable 
An ability to be creative and exploit the unexpected96 is key to SOF effectiveness. 
SOF encourages innovative thinking unrestricted by perceived limitations, creating 
solutions outside the conventional military context and challenging routine military 
procedures. SOF is capable of planning and executing missions and using technology in 
novel ways, creating solutions that may be “unthinkable” to the adversary.97 Thus, SOF 
may fulfill difficult tasks and devise critical tactical surprises that increase success and 
mitigate personnel and political risks. 
 
                                                 
93 DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual,” 10. 
94 Johnson and Christensen, “Clarifying the Anti-Systemic Elements of Special Operations: a 
Conceptual Inquiry,” (Special Operations Journal, not yet published), 13–14. 
95 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, (AJP 3–5), 2–1. 
96 Anton Asklund Johnson and Gitte Højstrup Christensen use the word “unexpectancy,” throughout 
their article. 
97 Johnson and Christensen, “Clarifying the Anti-Systemic Elements of Special Operations: a 
Conceptual Inquiry” (Special Operations Journal, not yet published), 12–13. 
 41
B. ORGANIZATION OF DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES  
In 2012, a government coalition signed the Danish Defense Agreement 2013–
2017,98 directing how the ministry of defense “will continue to contribute to safeguarding 
Danish foreign and security policy interests, while also our national security is 
safeguarded by international deployment of military capabilities.”99 The document sets 
the overall framework for the purpose, organization, role, goals, priorities, and budgets of 
the armed forces. The agreement recognizes NATO and the UN as the cornerstones of 
Danish security and defense policy. 
1. Danish Special Operations Command 
A new development in the defense agreement was the recognition of a need to 
strengthen and increase DANSOF capabilities and capacities by placing the two 
DANSOF units, the army Jægerkorpset (JGK) and naval Frømandskorpset (FKP), under 
a new and permanent special operations command (SOKOM), which became part of the 
Danish joint command. The overall political purpose of this command is to enable 
DANSOF to engage in strategic challenges rather than serve in a solely tactical capacity. 
SOKOM was established in 2014, and in June 2015, DANSOF units were placed beneath 
it, with a two-star general or admiral commanding under the chief of defense. The 
organization is staffed by 65 employees and divided into development and production 
divisions, which are further divided into sections.100 SOKOM is responsible for force 
development, force-production polices, doctrine, training requirements, resource 
management, administration, procurement, personnel administration, and logistics. The 
command intends to reach an initial operational capacity for a Danish contribution to a 
strategic SOF-led mission by 2020.101 
                                                 
98 Danish Ministry of Defense, Danish Defense Agreement 2013–2017 (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry 
of Defense, 30 November 2012), accessed 24 January 2016, 
http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Documents/TheDanishDefenceAgrement2013-2017english-version.pdf. 
99 Danish Ministry of Defense, Danish Defense Agreement 2013–2017, 1. 
100 As of 19 January 2016, the number of employees is 43; (internal Danish organizational chart).  
101 Specialoperationskommandoen [Special Operations Command], Paradigmeskift: Forsvarets Nye 
Specialoperationer – Chefen for Specialoperationskommandoens rammedirektiv, [Paradigm Shift: 
Commander SOCOM’s Framework], SOKOM: Ålborg, July 2015, 7.  
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Regarding military operations and political interests, SOKOM will contribute 
with “small, operational, and rapid deployable capabilities.”102 SOKOM intends to 
develop a capability that can be deployed to “minimize the risk that military forces are 
engaged in protracted conflicts or that unwanted escalation is created”103 and develop a 
staff capacity that can contribute to a special-operations component command such as 
NATO’s.104 Unlike other branch commands, SOKOM may take operational control of a 
mission. SOKOM plans to develop SOF units to that can deploy both a maritime and 
land-task group, and, in the future, an air group. Overall, SOKOM’s objective is to 
deliver strategic effects that support Danish political and security interests. 
2. Danish SOF Units 
Denmark currently fields the FKP and JGK.105 The FKP maritime SOF unit was 
created in 1957 to perform DA, SR, and MA missions. The unit can conduct insertion and 
infiltration by sea, air, and land, with its primary expertise in maritime operations. FKP 
has participated in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia (Operation Ocean 
Shield).  
The JGK was created in 1961; like the FKP, its primary tasks are DA, SR, and 
MA, and it is capable of insertion and infiltration by land, air, and sea, with a primary 
expertise in land operations. The JGK has participated in international operations in the 
Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, including the U.S.-led Task Force K-Bar in Afghanistan 
in 2002, as part of an international SOF coalition and in conjunction with the FKP.106 
                                                 
102 Specialoperationskommandoen, [Paradigm Shift: Commander SOCOM’s Framework Dir], 5. 
103 Specialoperationskommandoen, [Paradigm Shift: Commander SOCOM’s Framework Dir], 5. 
104 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Special Operations Component Command Manual – NATO 
SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) 80–002,” (Mons, Belgium: NSHQ, October 2014), 13. NATO Special 
Operations Component Commands (SOCC) are non-standing headquarters within NATO Force Structure 
that, when assigned for missions, will have a number of special operations task groups and a command and 
control element. 
105 In the summer of 2015, the two units came under command of the Danish Special Operations 
Command. 
106 United States Navy, “Enduring Freedom Task Force Earns Presidential Unit Citation,” December 
8, 2004, accessed 24 February 2016, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=16216. 
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From the beginning, these units have trained and participated in exercises jointly 
and with SOF units from the United States of America, Norway, Holland, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom, and as a result have tactical military standards and skills 
comparable to these foreign units. Selection and training requirements are also similar, 
and Danish equipment is generally of the same quality and technical functionality. 
3. DANSOF Limitations 
Though the FKP and JGK enjoy special strengths and capabilities, they also 
operate under significant limitations, especially in numbers, intelligence assets, and 
aviation.107 
a. Small Numbers 
Historically, both units train between five and seven new operators annually. This 
scarcity may affect unit endurance significantly. For example, during Task Force 7 
(TF7’s) mission in Afghanistan (2012–2013), the FKP was also engaged in a national 
police mission and Operation Ocean Shield, a NATO counter-piracy mission off Somalia. 
Because DANSOF has limited capacity and resources, it is necessary to draw 
support from other military units, including infantry, military police, army engineers, 
interpreters, aviators, and the national intelligence service. Civilian agencies such as the 
Danish national police have also supported SOF missions. Thus, a DANSOF task force 
may draw on resources from all the military services, as well as outside agencies, to 
fulfill a specific task. 
b. Intelligence Assets 
Another DANSOF limitation is few intelligence assets. Generally speaking, SOF 
missions are intelligence-driven. Currently, however, Danish SOF lacks the substantial 
intelligence capability of comparable countries. Experience from previous missions 
shows that it is necessary for DANSOF to draw on intelligence from coalition partners to 
be effective. 
                                                 
107 Number classified. 
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c. Aviation 
While the Danish air force does not have dedicated SOF aviators, conducting SOF 
missions is one of its capabilities. Helicopter pilots often train with the FKP, JGK, and 
the special operations unit of the Danish national police. In addition, the air force has sent 
a helicopter pilot to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s defense-analysis program, 
which focuses on special operations and irregular warfare, to improve understanding and 
support of SOF operations and SOKOM.108 
C. SOF BEST PRACTICES IN STABILIZATION ENGAGEMENTS 
This section describes how DANSOF has applied SOF doctrine historically and 
outlines a specific mission. Focusing on Task Force (TF7) and how it built the Afghan 
provincial response company Helmand (PRC-H) between February 2012 and December 
2013, the narrative reveals how TF7 managed the expectations of the Danish government, 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) joint-force command (JFC),109 and 
ISAF SOF, the component command110 overseeing TF7. Lessons from other sources are 
also explored. 
1. Lessons from Task Force 7 
Denmark supported the U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan almost from the 
beginning, sending SOF as early as 2002. From 2006–2014, the Danish military focused 
its main efforts on Helmand province, including a relatively large conventional battalion 
battle group of around 700 soldiers stationed close to the city of Gereskh. Other offices of 
the Danish government were present in Helmand, including a police detachment and 
advisors for coordinating Danish efforts concerning governance, law and order, human 
                                                 
108 Værnsfælles Forsvarsommando, Flyverstaben [Danish Joint Command, Air Staff], “Effektive 
løsninger i ansvarlig balance – Chefen for Flyverstabens rammedirektiv for flyvevåbnet [Effective 
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109 The Joint Force Command is the headquarters (HQ) in charge of a theatre of operations; for 
example, Afghanistan. 
110 A Component Command is a HQ under the Joint Force Command in charge of one of the services: 
Army, Navy, Air Force or SOF. 
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rights, and education.111 These missions generated valuable lessons with respect to DISE 
operations.112 
In early 2011, DANSOF sent a fact-finding team to Kabul to join U.S. Task Force 
10 and ascertain how its MA missions were conducted. In April 2011, a Danish fact-
finding team joined TF10, which comprised SOF from U.S. 10th Group Special Forces 
and embedded SOF from Hungary and Romania. The variety of SOF units involved 
allowed DANSOF staff and operators to observe different approaches to training, 
advising, and assisting the provincial response companies.  
In its three months with the task force, the staff detachment participated in 
planning sessions, monitored TF10 missions, and recorded lessons from TF10 staff 
personnel. Foremost was the lesson of building a self-sustaining provincial response 
company. To that end, TF7 required a keen grasp of the culture so as to understand 
Afghan methods, routines, and operations and build a truly sustainable Afghan force, not 
merely a Western-style unit. The experience with Task Force 10 also taught DANSOF 
that it was necessary to be sensitive to Afghan culture while also introducing the right 
amount of organization, which the Afghans required. Another lesson was to avoid putting 
too much emphasis on combat troops, such as platoons and teams, and not enough on 
staff—which is the part of a unit critical to achieving indigenous self-sustainment. To 
correct imbalances, TF7 decided to focus on the entire PRC from the commander down 
to policemen. 
After pre-mission training in Denmark, DANSOF established TF7 by sending a 
preparation team to Lashkar Gah, the Helmand province capital, in January 2012 with the 
responsibility to initiate training, intelligence, and operations procedures necessary for 
the mission. TF7 also began to liaison with Task Force Helmand, a British-led brigade 
that operated from the main operating base, Lash (MOB Lash). MOB Lash became the 
main base for TF7, and Task Force Helmand was essential in providing quick-reaction 
                                                 
111 Udenrigsministeriet [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], “The Danish Helmand Plan 2011–2012” 
(Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011), 74, accessed 01 December 2015, 
http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/10977/pdf/Helmandplan2011_eng.pdf. 
112 “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement,” MoFA, MoD, MoJ, 8. 
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forces and other key support such as counter-improvised explosive device (IED) teams, 
medics, and unmanned aerial vehicles.  
In February 2012, TF7 began partnering with and training its Afghan counterpart. 
The provincial response company was in poor shape on all scores: manning was at 50 
percent of the planned 125 policemen; the base infrastructure was decrepit; bad hygiene 
was creating sickness; and food was poorly prepared, non-nutritious, and meager. To 
meet staffing demands, the PRC commander had hired anyone available. Most of the 60-
odd policemen could best be described as farmers with a gun in their hand. 
Given the ground conditions, TF7 met with the Afghan commander and updated 
the two-year plan for partnering with PRC-H, which TF7 had initiated during pre-mission 
training in Denmark. The components of the plan were to: 
 Establish a timeline with milestones for development of the PRC over a two-
year period. 
 Foster relationships and cooperation with key Afghan units, headquarters, and 
legal entities. 
 Create a balanced and self-sustaining PRC by training all sections of the 
headquarters, staff, and combat units. For this effort, an advisor from the 
Danish police and a military judicial advisor were included. 
 Develop Afghan instructors as soon as possible to support self-sustainment. 
 Select and train future leaders of the PRC as soon as possible. 
a. Unexpected Challenges 
Despite these efforts to create a plan, surprises occurred weekly, if not daily. Most 
of the problems stemmed from trying to create a self-sustaining force in less than two 
years. For months, TF7 struggled with manning its forces, selecting operational targets, 
and interacting with the Afghan judicial system, which was weak and ineffective, while 
slowly raising the PRC’s administrative and operational proficiency to acceptable levels. 
In addition, TF7 had to balance teaching the PRC critical warfighting skills and letting 
them learn by their own mistakes. Throughout, TF7 did all it could to protect the PRC 
from overly complicated or dangerous missions. Sometimes TF7 took the lead if they 
thought the gain from a mission was worth the risk. TF7’s determination to make the 
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Afghans stand on their own and be self-sufficient was so firm that the task force 
sacrificed operational success for a time. 
Several other issues slowed PRC development. One was getting the right 
operational equipment; TF7 constantly pushed for gear that the PRC could maintain by 
itself, consistently discouraging the Afghans from using equipment they could not 
maintain after the task force left. Another problem was corruption, which plagued all 
aspects of the Afghan system, including the police. It was a constant challenge to judge 
whether an act of corruption was worth prosecuting or should be ignored. For example, 
after only two months on the ground, TF7 had to ask the Helmand chief of police to fire 
the PRC commander upon evidence of corruption and abusing his authority. The PRC 
commander left with some of his best men, however, setting the PRC back. Ultimately it 
proved a good decision—a new commander with special police experience arrived a 
month later and was essential in making the PRC into a self-sustaining force over time. 
In addition to Afghan- or ISAF SOF-initiated operations, TF7 and PRC-H 
occasionally supported Task Force Helmand. However, this task force usually conducted 
operations with large armored infantry units using conventional search-and-destroy 
tactics contrary to efficient counterinsurgency tactics.113 These British operations seldom 
achieved much, because the Taliban simply refused to engage large units and withdrew to 
the hinterlands. Task Force Helmand provided an important lesson about the value of 
“going small” and partnering efficiently with local forces.  
b. Successes 
After ten months of building PRC proficiency, TF7 reached a milestone: the PRC 
went on its first operation with a warrant signed by the Lashkar Gar prosecutor and judge. 
PRC-H was one of the first special police units to go on a legally sanctioned operation of 
this nature, and it was used as an example throughout the ISAF system.  
As TF7’s departure date in December 2013 approached, PRC-H achieved other 
successes that set it apart from similar Afghan units: it was close to full manning; it had a 
                                                 
113 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 11. 
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solid cadre of officers and NCOs; it was well integrated into the Afghan police 
organization; and it could conduct successful, independent operations based on 
intelligence from its surveillance unit or provincial police headquarters. Given these 
milestones, TF7 felt they could hand over the PRC as a self-sustaining Afghan special 
police unit tailored to Afghan conditions.  
2. Key Principles Derived  
The DANSOF experience with TF7 yields two principal lessons for partnering 
with a host nation for stabilization and the roles that DANSOF in particular can play.  
a. Focus on the Population 
The first is to focus on the population, not the enemy. Initially, TF7 had a good 
understanding of the mission from their superiors in ISAF SOF, which was to deliver a 
self-sustaining PRC in two years. This goal seemed ambitious, but possible, so long as 
the PRC was developed gradually. ISAF SOF agreed that kinetic operations, at least in 
the beginning, would come second to the training and general development of the unit. 
However, though ISAF SOF agreed in theory, the reality was different, and a 
conventional military focus of attacking the enemy became the principal effort.  
Furthermore, though TF7 was initially allowed to focus on building the critical 
self-sustaining elements of the PRC, after three months ISAF SOF ordered TF7 to push 
the PRC harder toward kinetic operations than had been agreed. Other ISAF SOF task 
forces following these orders used the Afghans as an excuse for kinetic operations, rather 
than developing PRC proficiency and self-sufficiency. They most likely chose this 
approach because it was rewarded by higher command, was highly measurable in the 
form of enemies killed or captured, and was consistent with a belief that the main effort 
should be to neutralize the enemy faster than he could recruit new fighters.  
This focus on fighting the enemy directly contradicted several counterinsurgency 
and stabilization principles. It is considered essential to separate the insurgents from the 
population by working by, with and through the host system to deny insurgents access. If 
not, insurgents will likely reproduce and sustain themselves by drawing from the 
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population, despite attrition from kills. To this end, an indigenous police force that can 
create separation by independently providing intelligence and manpower must be built.114 
This point echoes lessons from the British-led Malayan counterinsurgency, where the 
British massively employed local police in identifying and denying the infrastructure and 
population that the insurgents were exploiting. 
b. Build Independence 
The second principal lesson learned is to stand up forces and organizations that 
can operate independently of foreign advisors and support. Several established SOF 
principles support this aim:  
First, when possible, build on local, existing organizational structures, rather than 
organizing units in Western fashion. In the TF7 case, this was realized in the construction 
of the PRC and its relationships to various Afghan headquarters and the judicial system. 
If a Western-style organization had been created, it would most likely have collapsed as 
soon as its sponsors were not there to uphold it. The same holds true for tactics, 
techniques, and procedures; they had to endure after TF7 left, and thus were not as 
detailed and structured as a Western unit would prefer. 
Second, use local equipment, which can be supplied and maintained easier than 
Western. An important consideration of TF7 was to use equipment the Afghans were 
familiar with and could maintain, such as Kalashnikov rifles and heavy machine guns. 
Although superior weapons systems were available, it made no sense to make the 
Afghans dependent on, for example, mortars or unmanned aerial vehicles, because these 
systems were unsustainable over time. 
Third, it is not enough to empower the fighting elements of a unit. Staff and 
support functions must be equally developed, because they are the elements that create 
sustainability in the long term. This focus takes time and oversight, consuming scarce 
resources. The temptation is to sideline staff and support functions in favor of urgent 
priorities and the tangible measurements of success the fighting elements can deliver. 
                                                 
114 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 10–11, 13. 
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Finally, managing corruption and other problems requires a local, as opposed to a 
Western, mindset. Corruption was an ever-present dilemma and it was impossible for 
TF7 to comprehend all its dimensions. TF7 tried to achieve balance by accepting some 
level of corruption as an integral part of Afghan life, while at the same time coming down 
hard when corruption was averse to building a reliable police force the people could 
eventually trust. 
3. Lessons from RAND  
In addition to the TF7 experience, research on other SOF deployments is useful 
for gleaning best practices and lessons learned. The RAND Corporation published a 
report in 2015 on building Afghan SOF and special police units. The report is based on 
field research and interviews of U.S. and coalition SOF units deployed in 2013, including 
those of Australia, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and host-nation partner units. The 
report also examines SOF partnerships in Iraq and Colombia.115 Findings are grouped 
according to operational tempo and sustainability, depth of partnership and rapport, and 
continuity and training. 
a. Tempo and Sustainability 
The report recommends that “operations must be subordinated to capability 
development.”116 Examples from Afghanistan show that indigenous forces were tactically 
proficient, but lacked the structure necessary to support their own operations, as well as 
operational planning, intelligence collection, and logistics. The lack of intelligence 
capabilities within Afghan SOF and conventional forces weakened the PRC’s ability to 
conduct operations; partner forces were needed to build and enable these functions.  
Owing to the short time available for missions, it is important that operations be 
conducted with an eye toward long-term sustainability. In Afghanistan, indigenous SOF 
                                                 
115 Austin Long, Todd C. Helmus, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Christopher M. Schnaubelt, and Peter 
Chalk, Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond – Challenges and Best 
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116 Austin Long et al., Building Special Operations Partnerships in Afghanistan and Beyond, 73. 
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forces conducted their operations using assets from international partners. This borrowing 
becomes a problem when the partner force leaves. Although it is counterintuitive that a 
partner force withholds its full assets, deliberate measures must be taken to wean 
indigenous SOF from unsustainable support.117 An undue focus on conducting operations 
with dispatch can leave a residue of underdeveloped and unsustainable capabilities. 
Capacity building should start in the early stages of a partnership and include not only 
tactical skills, but also supporting structures. 
b. Depth of Partnership and Rapport 
The RAND report emphasizes the importance of achieving a deep partnership by 
building rapport118—for example, by reassigning members of partner units back to their 
previous indigenous unit. The report also encourages partner units to participate in social 
events with indigenous to strengthen cultural understanding and respect. This requires 
maturity among the operators. In Afghanistan, Norwegian, Lithuanians, and British 
forces shared social events such as Christmas and Muslim holidays, dancing with the 
Afghans, and even holding hands.119 It recommends that partner units live together with 
indigenous forces if possible; but the report notes the threat of insider attacks and advises 
this should occur on a case-by-case basis. Another essential observation in the report is 
that only experienced seniors should be assigned to key mentorship positions,120 raising 
again the necessity of maturity. To develop appropriate respect and trust, personnel must 
have experience of working with indigenous forces and understand how relationships are 
built. The successful capacity and capability development of indigenous forces requires 
thoughtful measures to foster rapport and trustful relationships. 
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c. Continuity and Training 
Continuity of operations must be maintained to avoid “reinventing the wheel.”121 
This includes returning units to their previous areas of deployment to strengthen 
familiarity; using a staggered relief-in-place rather than have entire units rotate in and out 
with little or no overlap; ensuring proper handoff of information between outgoing and 
incoming units; and creating a multiyear plan for deployments.122 However, these 
recommendations are not always easy to uphold, due to the small number of operators 
and that SOF may be engaged in missions elsewhere. Part of continuity is setting goals 
for the indigenous force to assess the development of its performance, looking at the 
functional capabilities of the host unit at the tactical and staff levels. Key performance 
tasks should be described and developed to allow the mentoring force to monitor 
progress. However, the RAND report also suggests that a host-nation force conduct self-
assessments to become capable of evaluating their own performance.123 Hence, an 
effective assessment method should be adopted and introduced as early in the process as 
possible. RAND has published a sample report that provides an assessment framework 
for building partner capacity.124  
Another element for successful rapport building is pre-mission training. Proper 
and sufficient training and exercise prior to deployment prepares the operators for the 
specifics of a mission and helps prepare them for the mental transition of providing 
mentorship and advisement, as opposed to kinetics. Examples from Iraq and Afghanistan 
stress the importance of a positive and respectful atmosphere between host and mentor 
forces. To encourage trust and partnership, pre-mission training should include cultural 
and religious awareness and basic language proficiency.125 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter describes SOF doctrine and characteristics, primarily in the context 
of stabilization operations, and outlines the Danish special operations command and two 
SOF units, noting their core capabilities and range of skills. The chapter then highlights 
lessons learned from DANSOF training of the Afghan provincial response company in 
Helmand province.  
SOF’s ability to deploy rapidly and operate in small groups with little logistical 
support provides decision makers with a tool they can use on short notice and with little 
political and military impact. When engaging in building security capacity, it is crucial 
that the functions of the entire force be considered throughout the effort. Tactical ability 
and operational skills rarely prevail alone; staff and support elements are equally import 
in achieving lasting results.  
The final chapter concludes with summary thoughts and recommendations for 
using DANSOF in stabilization operations. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this capstone is to operationalize Denmark’s policy for integrated 
stabilization engagements in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world (DISE) by 
considering key concepts and providing recommendations on how DANSOF can support 
political efforts aimed at stabilizing fragile states.  
Chapter II began with a summary of the DISE, describing and identifying 
Denmark’s principal efforts and key tools for stabilizing fragile states and conflict-
affected areas. The chapter then defined and explained key terms, including stabilization 
engagements; a whole-of-government approach; goals, measurement of success, and risk 
acceptance; and capacity and state-building. The chapter also identified and explained 
two less mentioned yet critical tools that affect overall stabilization efforts: intelligence, 
and information activities. Chapter III gave a summary of SOF doctrine and 
characteristics, in addition to outlining the organization of Danish Special Operations. 
The chapter then gave an example of DANSOF in a stabilization engagement, describing 
its experience with Task Force 7 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in 2012, and 
summarizes lesson learned from allied stabilization engagements as outlined in a RAND 
report. 
This chapter offers general recommendations for operationalizing DISE, followed 
by recommendations for employing DANSOF within the goals of the DISE framework. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO OPERATIONALIZE DISE 
This capstone makes recommendations for operationalizing DISE on prevention, 
information activities, intelligence collection, and managing risk. 
1. Prevention 
DISE stresses the importance of preventive measures to keep emerging conflicts 
from growing into full-scale crises. To ensure a timely response to emerging conflicts, 
Danish agencies should prepare for stabilization engagements in peacetime, including 
training and planning among government agencies and the military. Interagency 
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collaboration exercises in particular would strengthen understanding of how each 
organization within the Danish government works, what its capabilities and limitations 
are, and how to develop standard operating procedures for rapid reaction to potential or 
actual conflict. Joint exercises would also allow the key leaders of the various agencies to 
know each other and develop a network before a crisis erupts.  
In addition, Denmark should prepare for stabilization interventions by creating an 
interagency force equivalent to the UK stabilization unit, which is an integrated civil–
military unit of experts, police officers, and military forces that operates in high-threat 
and high-risk environments.  
Because for policy reasons Denmark is unlikely to act in isolation, it is important 
to coordinate efforts not only with domestic agencies, but international partners as well, 
such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.126  
2. Information Activities 
In the information age, getting messages out and countering anti-government 
communications is essential in stabilization engagements. ISIS’ successful recruiting 
campaign is a recent reminder of the importance of knowing an audience and reaching it 
successfully to counter adversarial messaging.  
To underscore the need for integration in information efforts, this capstone uses 
the term “information activities” to describe actions in this field. To achieve maximal 
synergy and effect from the whole-of-government approach, information activities should 
be coordinated centrally by a lead agency. This centralized coordination is not expected 
to hamper individual agency messaging, but rather, to ensure that all messaging efforts 
work in the same direction. This is true for both civilian agencies and the military, 
including DANSOF.  
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that involve the employment of military forces, Danish Ministry of Defense, website, accessed 05 May 
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Finally, the Danish government should incorporate and support information 
activities that allow the host nation to spread its own message and contradict anti-
government communications. Fragile governments generally have a keen understanding 
of the importance of controlling the information flow, but may gain valuable 
organizational and procedural knowledge from a partner country. Information activities 
should be closely coordinated with the local government to allow it to take ownership of 
the process and continue after the engagement ends.  
3. Intelligence 
Intelligence efforts are crucial for understanding the problems of fragile states and 
how to intervene productively. They should focus on two broad collection targets: those 
that identify potential or actual insurgent infrastructure, and those that concern population 
vulnerabilities. Insurgent infrastructure provides the means to gain finances, supplies, 
shelter, recruits, intelligence and freedom of movement. The government needs to 
understand these capabilities to counter them and draw popular support away from the 
insurgents—which is the ultimate goal of such efforts. The government’s creation of on-
the-ground human intelligence networks is critical for interdicting insurgent 
infrastructure.  
Stabilization efforts must pay particular attention to the population and understand 
its vulnerabilities and desires. Cultural intelligence helps identify social, political and 
economic factors that influence the local environment, providing understanding of 
customs, beliefs and behavior and creating awareness of grievances and how to address 
them. Intelligence tools should include open-source and open dialog with the different 
actors in the engagement area, such as government institutions, civic institutions, 
religious leaders, and local warlords. Gathering and analyzing cultural intelligence should 
begin as early as possible so that actors on the ground are prepared before they arrive.  
The police force is an important potential resource for long-term intelligence 
gathering on the population and nefarious networks. Benefiting from daily contact with 
the people and wielding a thorough knowledge of local communities and insurgent 
infrastructure, the police have a tremendous advantage over other forces. To develop this 
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dimension, the Danish government should pursue an effort that balances the robustness 
and early readiness of the military intelligence with a focus on encouraging the local 
police to become the main source of intelligence. 
4. Risk Management 
Assessing and mitigating the risks actors face on the ground run the gamut from 
preventing disease to foiling insider attacks to combat. One important measure in risk 
management is to provide training in cultural understanding. Understanding local 
customs, values and behaviors so as to gain the empathy needed to act in a well-adjusted 
manner can relieve tensions and prevent culturally offensive actions. The Danish 
government should also ensure personal-security training that combines cultural 
awareness with physical protection to decrease risk in a population-centric environment. 
Denmark can mitigate risk in stabilization engagements by focusing on the end 
state, not on short-term gains and losses. Working in close coordination with on-the-
ground actors, the government should devise and monitor benchmarks for progress. Such 
a practice, together with common understanding of the goals of the engagement, may 
improve long-term mission success. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE USE OF DANSOF IN A DISE 
FRAMEWORK 
DANSOF offers a range of skills to be employed in realizing DISE goals, 
including conflict prevention and pre-conflict engagements. In particular, DANSOF 
specializes in rapid reaction; whole-of-government synergy; and capacity building. For 
maximal benefit, these efforts must be guided by a cross-collaborative intention. A 
summary is laid out in Table 4.  
1. Rapid Reaction  
DANSOF is a sophisticated tool for responding quickly to emerging or violent 
conflicts, due to its small size, logistical self-sufficiency, and diversity in deployment 
methods and tasks. Specifically, DANSOF can be used for the following rapid-reaction 
tasks: 
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a. Reconnaissance, Intelligence, and Contact 
DANSOF is valuable in early reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, contact with 
useful factions, and assessment of the engagement area—including contact and initial 
report with host forces, agencies, non-governmental factions, and international entities. 
These early, on-the-ground skills are part of DANSOF’s special reconnaissance 
capability. 
b. Initial Execution of Whole-of-Government Tasks 
DANSOF may be used to fulfill initial task execution for other whole-of-
government agencies, and provide these services until the agencies arrive on scene. 
Activities may range from diplomatic engagements to intelligence missions. DANSOF 
emphasizes cross-institutional training among Danish agencies in peacetime to prepare 
for such missions. Combined with an ability to deploy anywhere, this capability makes 
DANSOF ideal for vicarious assignments. 
c. Strengthening of Host Security Forces 
Rapid strengthening of host-nation security forces is a DANSOF area of expertise. 
For example, DANSOF can partner with local security forces to engage counter-state 
elements ranging from criminal organizations to insurgents. If needed, DANSOF can 
work and conduct operations independently until local security forces are sufficiently 
trained.  
2. Whole-of-Government Functions 
When a rapid reaction has fulfilled its purpose, achievements may be sustained 
through a long-haul effort. DANSOF offers a range of long-term capabilities that foster 
synergy between the different agencies involved in a whole-of-government approach. As 
a cross-institutional force oriented toward joint and interagency performance, DANSOF 
trains extensively in peacetime to work efficiently with all appropriate elements—for 
example, intelligence and diplomatic personnel. In Danish whole-of-government 
stabilization efforts, DANSOF can be used for the following functions: 
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a. Initial Execution of Whole-of-Government Tasks in Hostile 
Environments 
DANSOF can execute whole-of-government tasks in environments too dangerous 
for other agencies, performing them until the situation improves or the agencies acquire 
training that allows them to assume responsibility. 
b. Support for Other Agencies 
Support for other agencies’ tasks, including planning, deployment, and execution 
of stabilization efforts, is ideally assigned to DANSOF. This is relevant where other 
agencies’ capabilities and tasks are too sensitive or complex to be handed over or where 
an agency’s deployment in a remote, dangerous, or inaccessible area can be handled by 
DANSOF. An important aspect of interagency support is DANSOF’s ability to lower risk 
to the agency supported. 
3. Capacity Building  
Capacity building covers a range of tasks devoted to developing sustainable 
capabilities within the host nation. DANSOF is particularly trained for this purpose. 
Specifically DANSOF can be used for the following activities: 
a. Training and Advising Local Military 
 Training, partnering with, and advising local military forces is a DANSOF core 
mission and one for which it is uniquely qualified. DANSOF’s main efforts should be on 
local SOF, both units and headquarters, with a focus on the strategic and national level, 
where limited DANSOF resource may have greater impact, as discussed in Chapter III.  
b. Training and Advising Local Police 
For DANSOF, the main effort in training, partnering with, and advising local 
police forces should be on building the capacity of the special police, both units and 
headquarters. These forces should be trained and advised cross-institutionally with police 
and judicial advisors, as described in the case study on Task Force 7. As part of their 
interactions, DANSOF can help military and police forces combat criminal elements and 
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insurgents. This may involve DANSOF’s carrying the brunt of the combat effort in the 
early phases and supervising later stages. 
c. Supporting Intelligence 
DANSOF is equipped to develop and support improved intelligence-gathering 
capacity within the military and police for the purpose of identifying potential or actual 
insurgent infrastructure and population vulnerabilities. The main intelligence focus of the 
stabilization engagement should be on building police capacities. DANSOF can help 
develop this capability cross-institutionally with police advisors. 
4. DANSOF Cross-Collaboration 
Emphasizing that international and interagency cross-collaboration is essential to 
DISE goals and a critical DANSOF skillset, this capstone recommends two key policies 
in the employment of DANSOF, as follows. 
a. Cross-Institutional Cooperation 
DANSOF should work closely with relevant government agencies, both national 
and international. To create smooth collaboration and thus be prepared for timely 
prevention of violence, this cooperation should start with peacetime training and continue 
throughout pre-mission preparation and planning, execution, and evaluation of tasks and 
missions. 
b. Local Sustainability 
DANSOF should work by, with, and through local agencies in fragile states to 
support self-sustaining capabilities that can work independently when the engagement is 
over. DANSOF should avoid technology, procedures, and organizational structures 
unsuited to the local culture or environment. A focus on short-term wins against anti-
government forces, using, for example, advanced weapons or communication systems, 
may backfire by making long-term success dependent on technology and equipment that 
local forces cannot maintain after DANSOF leaves. 
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Table 4.   Summary of Recommendations for DANSOF Support to DISE. 
 Requirement Capability 
Rapid reaction • Early reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, liaison, and 
assessment 
• Initial execution of other agencies’ tasks until they arrive  
• Rapid support to the security sector; rapid combating of 
criminal elements and insurgents 
 
Whole of government • Execution of other agencies’ task until environment 
becomes permissive 
• Support to other agencies’ tasks, including deployment, 
planning, execution, and security 
 
Capacity building • Train, partner and advice military forces: SOF units and 
HQ. 
• Train, partner and advice police forces: special police units 
and HQ. 
• As part of train, partner and advice combat criminal 
elements and insurgents. 
• Support the creation of military and police intelligence 
capacity. 
 
Cross collaboration • Cooperation with other agencies, both national and 
international. 




Stabilization efforts by international actors in fragile states and conflict-affected 
areas play a vital role in peace and security—before, during, and after conflicts erupt. 
Denmark’s DISE policies reflect the government’s intention of playing an active role in 
such efforts. Through experience derived in international engagements, Denmark has 
realized the potential of integrated political approaches to fragile-state conflicts, by which 
a combination of diplomatic, development, defense, and economic efforts are applied in a 
preventive rather than reactive way. Denmark can strengthen this whole-of-government 
approach by prioritizing these efforts at the highest political level and increasing inter-
governmental collaboration and coordination. To this end, DISE policy should include an 
organization focused solely on stabilization efforts, integrating capabilities from diverse 
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departments and ministries. It is paramount that international efforts be well coordinated, 
including goals, ways, and means. Denmark can and should take the initiative toward a 
“whole international community” approach by the judicious use of existing organizations. 
This capstone recommends that DANSOF can support Denmark’s stabilization efforts by 
performing tasks such as prevention, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and 
assessment, security, capacity building, support to national and international agencies, 
and liaison with international agencies and local authorities. 
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